

Accidental Mix of Chemicals Caused Toxic Release

Lessons Learned

Volume 02 Issue 02

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Accidental Mix of Chemicals Caused Toxic Release

Purpose

To conduct a small group “lessons learned” activity to share information gained from incident investigations.

To understand “lessons learned” through a systems of safety viewpoint.



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The incident and recommendations made are from an actual USW represented facility. These recommendations are a product of the site’s analysis of the incident and not meant to represent the USW official view on the topic(s). In fact, one of the goals of this exercise is evaluate the recommendations made and to suggest improvements.

Introduction

One Hour “Lessons Learned” Safety Training Activity

This is a Small Group Activity Method (SGAM) exercise. It is designed for use in toolbox style meetings where a group of craft persons, operators, or other small group is assembled for a safety training session. The whole group should be further divided into smaller discussion groups of four to six people.

The tone of the meetings should be informal to create as much discussion as possible within the groups and among the groups. Active participation by group members is essential for this exercise to be successful.

If you plan to present a Lessons Learned Activity and have not been trained in the USW worker trainer program, you should contact the USW Health, Safety & Environment Department:

Phone (412) 562-2581

email: safety@steelworkers-usw.org for trainer information.

For this exercise, each person in the group should have their own copy of this activity printed in its entirety. The exercise consists of three tasks. Each task is designed to provoke thought and generate discussion about the incident at hand. Each discussion group should designate a scribe to keep notes and report back to the facilitator and class after each task. When the exercise is completed, review the Summary on page 13.

Definitions of terms used in this exercise are provided throughout the activity. A glossary of terms is also provided in the appendix.

The incident(s) depicted in this activity are based upon real occurrences. The names of persons and corporations are fictitious.

Task 1

Please read the following scenario:

A bleach (Sodium Hypochlorite) truck arrived at the Water Treatment Plant for a delivery. The driver pulled the truck into position and the operator for the area came over and removed a cap from the fitting for the hose connection.

Next to the bleach tank was an Aluminum Sulfate tank. Aluminum Sulfate is used to treat the solids in the water. The aluminum sulfate attaches itself to the solids making the solids heavier whereby the solids drop and are more easily filtered.

Within two minutes of pumping, both the operator and the driver noticed an irritating odor. The operator instructed the driver to shut down the truck. The operator and the driver noticed gas coming from the top of the tank. The odor was carried across the facility.

After receiving a call about the odor, a helper was sent to check on the operator because there wasn't a response when called on the radio.

The operator went back to the connection, wearing a half mask respirator, to bleed the fill line in the event they needed to disconnect the hose. At this time the operator realized that the truck had been connected to the Aluminum Sulfate tank. What the operator did not realize, was that the mixing of the bleach and the aluminum sulfate would start a violent reaction that released Chlorine gas.

The operator experienced some burning in his chest and coughing from the exposure.

The plant emergency response team was called and administered oxygen to the operator. Fortunately the operator did not suffer any injury or illness as a result of the exposure.

After reviewing the truck connections it was noticed that the piping to the tank is labeled with the tank contents but the label cannot be seen at the point of the truck fill connection.

In this scenario, training on the use and limitations of respirators and other PPE must be implemented. The employer must assess the exposure potential and provide the proper respiratory protective equipment. If the concentration of the contaminant is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) **or unknown**, then airline respirators with escape capabilities or SCBA respirators are required. Also training on the use and limitations of respirators and other PPE must be implemented.

Task 1 *(continued)*


On the next page you will find a logic tree that shows how the investigators at this site linked the incident that occurred (the top event) to the facts described in the scenario and the incident’s root causes. Below each root cause in the logic tree you will find a block with the title “SOS” (System of Safety).

Find the boxes marked SOS. Directly above those boxes will be a root cause of the incident. Your task is to complete the logic tree by identifying the *major* system of safety affected where the root cause failure occurred and list it in the box. These “systems” are listed in a chart on page 9. *Note: some of the SOS boxes may already be completed for you.*

Please select someone in your group to act as scribe to report back your answers.

A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity

A **Logic Tree** is a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.



Task 2

A. Below you will find two lists. On the left are the root causes from the logic tree on the previous page. On the right are recommendations made by the team that investigated this incident. On the chart below identify which of the “recommendations” would eliminate or reduce each “root cause” by placing the number of the recommendation(s) on the line provided. More than one recommendation can apply to a root cause.

	Root Causes	Recommendations
	A. Bleach truck was connected to the wrong fill line.	1. Review truck connections and ensure labeling is at the point of the connections.
	B. Labeling of tank contents is not clear from the point of the truck connection	2. Establish a procedure to lock end caps of fill lines with locks specific to a chemical.
	C. Hose connection fittings, fit both fill lines.	3. Include truck connection labeling as part of safety audits.
	D. No training on potential of mixing chemicals.	4. Develop warnings about mixing bleach and Aluminum Sulfate. In the appropriate operating procedures for offloading each chemical.
	E. No warning on tanks of hazards of mixing chemicals	5. Separate/move fill lines to greater than one hose length apart.
		6. Evaluate hose connections and the accidental mixing of chemicals in all PHA/PSSR’s.
		PHA – Process Hazard Analysis PSSR- Pre-Start up Safety Review

A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity

B. Use the concepts found on the factsheets on pages 9 through 12 and evaluate the recommendations from Question A. How would you strengthen or add to the list?

Task 3


Discuss ways in which the “Lessons Learned”(listed below) from this incident can be applied at your workplace. Please explain.

Lessons Learned


- Verify what chemicals are going where. Be aware when making connections, especially if it is possible to connect to more than one tank.
- Learn what chemicals are in your area and what their possible reactions might be if accidentally mixed.
- If you are issued communication devices (radios) make sure they are working properly.
- Process Hazard Analysis and Pre-Startup Safety Reviews should look at the potential results of accidentally mixing chemicals and make recommendations to eliminate or control the hazards.

A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity

Systems of Safety And Subsystems

Major Safety Systems	Design & Engineering	Maintenance & Inspection	Mitigation Devices	Warning Devices	Training & Procedures	Personal Protective Factors
Level of Prevention	Highest—the first line of defense	Middle—the second line of defense				Lowest—the last line of defense
Effectiveness	Most Effective					Least Effective
Goal	<i>To eliminate hazards.</i>	<i>To further minimize and control hazards.</i>				<i>To protect when higher level systems fail.</i>
Examples of Safety Sub-Systems*	Technical Design and Engineering of Equipment, Processes and Software Management of Change (MOC)** Chemical Selection and Substitution Safe Siting Work Environment HF Organizational Staffing HF Skills and Qualifications HF Management of Personnel Change (MOPC) Work Organization and Scheduling HF Allocation of Resources Codes, Standards and Policies*	Inspection and Testing Maintenance Quality Control Turnarounds and Overhauls Mechanical Integrity	Enclosures, Barriers and Containment Relief and Check Valves Shutdown and Isolation Devices Fire and Chemical Suppression Devices	Monitors Process Alarms Facility Alarms Community Alarms Emergency Notification Systems	Operating Manuals and Procedures Process Safety Information Process, Job and Other Types of Hazard Assessment and Analysis Permit Programs Emergency Preparedness and Response Training Information Resources Communications Investigations and Lessons Learned	Personal Decision-making and Actions HF Personal Protective Equipment and Devices HF Stop Work Authority
HF – Indicates that this sub-system is often included in a category called Human Factors . * There may be additional subsystems that are not included in this chart. Also, in the workplace many subsystems are interrelated. It may not always be clear that an issue belongs to one subsystem rather than another. ** The Codes, Standards and Policies and Management of Change sub-systems listed here are related to Design and Engineering. These subsystems may also be relevant to other systems, for example, Mitigation Devices. When these sub-systems relate to systems other than Design and Engineering they should be considered as part of those other systems, not Design and Engineering.						

All Systems of Safety Are Not Created Equal!




Surprisingly, the same hazard can often be addressed in more than one system. Take the low pipe in the doorway above, on the next two pages you'll see how this same problem could be handled by each of the major Systems of Safety.

Which is the best approach? Well, if you look at the Systems of Safety Chart on the previous page, you will find the SOS's arranged in order of strength: the most powerful – Design – on down to the least powerful – Personal Protective Factors.

A good investigation team will consider the full range of recommendations for each root cause.

A USW "Lessons Learned" Activity



Personal Protective Factors

Sub-systems that include a broad range of working conditions and situations that affect workers.


- Weakest system
- Controls the hazard directly at the individual's level



Procedures and Training

The instructions and knowledge necessary to maintain and operate equipment or processes

- Easier to affect groups of workers.
- Dependent on individuals' memories and lack of distraction




The Warning System

Devices that warn of a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation.

- Draws attention
- May be missed or ignored

A USW "Lessons Learned" Activity



Sub-systems that automatically act to control or reduce the effect of hazards.

- Workers protected automatically

The system responsible for maintaining, repairing and inspecting equipment and processes.

- Vital to make sure even the best designed system continues to function safely

The primary (highest level) system that designs the hazard out of the process.

- Strongest system
- Hazard eliminated

Summary: Lessons Learned

1. The objective of “lessons learned” is to prevent accidents through identifying and correcting underlying defects in systems of safety. To achieve maximum prevention, all recommended changes should be made.
2. Corrective action resulting from lessons learned is one of the best methods for achieving proactive health and safety. Maximum prevention is achieved by correcting the conditions that led to the incident at other sites in the plant and at other sites.
3. Systems of safety-based analysis help identify the underlying causes of incidents and are valuable for determining what corrective measures should be taken as a result of the lessons learned.
4. Many times the result of an incident investigation is that worker error is identified as the main contributing factor. When a systems of safety-based analysis is used, multiple root causes are usually uncovered.
5. The most effective controls of health and safety hazards are those which are integrated or designed into the process, such as engineering controls. The least effective controls involve personal protective equipment and procedures that merely acknowledge the hazard and do nothing to eliminate it.
6. All work-related hazards must be evaluated before work begins to eliminate or reduce worker exposure to hazards and to prevent injuries.

Glossary of Terms (Appendix)

Several unique terms are used while doing the “Lessons Learned” exercises. Their definitions are listed below.

Contributing Factor—something that actively contributes to the production of a result, an ingredient.

Fact—a piece of information presented as having objective reality, an actual occurrence or event.

Hierarchy of Systems of Safety—the ranking of systems of safety as to their relative effectiveness in providing accident prevention. This hierarchy is represented by the “Fulcrum” with the most effective system of safety residing on the left side of the lever. Less effective systems reside further to the right on the lever.

Lessons Learned—A summation of an investigation that describes safety hazards or conditions with general educational recommendations to identify and correct similar conditions. These differ from investigation recommendations as illustrated below:

Investigation recommendation: Replace the carbon steel gate valve on the vacuum tower bottoms line with a chrome valve. The valve failed due to corrosion.

Lessons Learned: Verify that carbon steel valves and piping are not used in vacuum tower bottoms service because corrosion can cause them to fail.

Logic Tree—a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.

Recommendations—calls for specific changes that address each root cause of an incident or accident to prevent its reoccurrence.

Root Cause—basic cause of an accident found in management safety systems.

Glossary of Terms (*continued*)

Supports and Barriers—“supports” are conditions that promote or render assistance to implementing recommendations while “barriers” are conditions that obstruct the implementation of recommendations.

Systems of Safety—management systems that actively seek to identify and control hazards before they result in an incident or injury.

- Design and Engineering
- Maintenance & Inspection
- Mitigation Devices
- Warning Systems
- Procedures and Training
- Personal Protective Factors

Conducting a “Lessons Learned” Activity

Circle the number that best shows your response to each of the following questions.

1. How easy was it for you to understand the “systems of safety” approach presented in this activity?

4	3	2	1
Very easy	Somewhat easy	Somewhat hard	Very hard

2. How useful do you think this “systems of safety” way of thinking could be for tackling safety and health problems at your workplace?

4	3	2	1
Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not very useful	Of no use

3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The logic tree diagram approach can be helpful for analyzing the root causes of safety and health incidents.

4	3	2	1
Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree

4. Overall, how useful was this “lessons learned activity” for considering safety and health problems at your workplace?

4	3	2	1
Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not very useful	Of no use