

# **High Pressure Hydrogen Release**

**Lessons Learned**

**Volume 03 Issue 10**

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
## High Pressure Hydrogen Release

### Purpose

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To conduct a small group “lessons learned” activity to share information gained from incident investigations.

To understand “lessons learned” through a systems of safety viewpoint.



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The incident and recommendations made are from an actual USW represented facility. These recommendations are a product of the site’s analysis of the incident and not meant to represent the USW official view on the topic(s). In fact, one of the goals of this exercise is evaluate the recommendations made and to suggest improvements.

## ***Introduction***

### **One Hour “Lessons Learned” Safety Training Activity**

This is a Small Group Activity Method (SGAM) exercise. It is designed for use in toolbox style meetings where a group of craft persons, operators, or other small group is assembled for a safety training session. The whole group should be further divided into smaller discussion groups of four to six people.

The tone of the meetings should be informal to create as much discussion as possible within the groups and among the groups. Active participation by group members is essential for this exercise to be successful.

If you plan to present a Lessons Learned Activity and have not been trained in the USW worker trainer program, you should contact the USW Health, Safety & Environment Department:

Phone (412) 562-2581

email: [safety@steelworkers-usw.org](mailto:safety@steelworkers-usw.org) for trainer information.

For this exercise, each person in the group should have their own copy of this activity printed in its entirety. The exercise consists of three tasks. Each task is designed to provoke thought and generate discussion about the incident at hand. Each discussion group should designate a scribe to keep notes and report back to the facilitator and class after each task. When the exercise is completed, review the Summary on page 13.

Definitions of terms used in this exercise are provided throughout the activity. A glossary of terms is also provided in the appendix.

The incident(s) depicted in this activity are based upon real occurrences. The names of persons and corporations are fictitious.

## **Task 1**

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**Please read the following scenario:**

A seldom used hydrogen line was put in service to provide additional hydrogen to the Number 1 Hydrogen Desulfurization Unit (HDS). The line had a split in it due to water accumulation and freezing. Hydrogen escaped to atmosphere until the split was found and that section of the line was isolated.

About 1:30 am a processing unit shut down due to compressor problems. This reduced the hydrogen flow normally available to the #1 HDS unit. A decision was made to line up hydrogen directly from the hydrogen plant to the #1 HDS unit to provide additional hydrogen for this unit. Existing piping was available, but it had not been used in quite some time. This line ran from one operational unit to another requiring coordination between two crews. The line up was made by the night shift.

About 4:00 p.m. that afternoon operators noticed a loud noise. The noise was similar to “a loud air horn in use”. The noise was investigated and was found to be the result of high pressure hydrogen flowing through a 14” split in the 2” line that had been put in service the night before. The line was quickly blocked in on both sides of the split and the release stopped.

The 2” hydrogen line had not been inspected or maintained for an undetermined length of time. There was also a question of ownership of the line because it ran from one process unit to another. Each unit has its own operating crew.

Valves required to isolate the line were located in hard to reach areas and chain wheel operators needed to make these valves easily and safely operable were never installed. Work orders had been written long before the incident to install chain wheel operators but the work had never been completed.

## **Task 1** *(continued)*

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
**On the next page you will find a logic tree that shows how the investigators at this site linked the incident that occurred (the top event) to the facts described in the scenario and the incident’s root causes. Below each root cause in the logic tree you will find a block with the title “SOS” (System of Safety).**

**Find the boxes marked SOS. Directly above those boxes will be a root cause of the incident. Your task is to complete the logic tree by identifying the *major* system of safety affected where the root cause failure occurred and list it in the box. These “systems” are listed in a chart on page 9. *Note: some of the SOS boxes may already be completed for you.***

**Please select someone in your group to act as scribe to report back your answers.**

A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity

A **Logic Tree** is a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.



## Task 2

**A. Below you will find two lists. On the left are the root causes from the logic tree on the previous page. On the right are recommendations made by the team that investigated this incident. On the chart below identify which of the “recommendations” would eliminate or reduce each “root cause” by placing the number of the recommendation(s) on the line provided. More than one recommendation can apply to a root cause.**

	Root Causes	Recommendations
	A. Isolation valve was not accessible	1. Develop procedures to address piping between units and operator progressions.
	B. It was unclear as to who had ownership of this line	2. Inspect lines before placing them in service.
	C. 2” Line was not steam traced and insulated	3. Identify who has ownership of the piping and responsibility for operation and maintenance of the piping.
	D. Line was not inspected prior and tested prior to use.	4. Install chain wheel operators on the hydrogen line valves that are not accessible by a platform.
		5. Identify and steam trace low points where water can accumulate, freeze, and break piping.

*A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity*

**B. Use the concepts found on the factsheets on pages 9 through 12 and evaluate the recommendations from Question A. How would you strengthen or add to the list?**



### **Task 3**

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**Discuss ways in which the “Lessons Learned”(listed below) from this incident can be applied at your workplace. Please explain.**

#### **Lessons Learned**

- Identify and assign responsibility for lines running between units to prevent confusion as to whom the equipment belongs.
- Carefully inspect lines that have not been used for long periods of time to ensure they are still in good order. Pressure check if possible.
- Chain wheel operators required to operate hard to reach valves need to be installed in a timely manner.

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
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A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity

## Systems of Safety And Subsystems

Major Safety Systems	Design & Engineering	Maintenance & Inspection	Mitigation Devices	Warning Devices	Training & Procedures	Personal Protective Factors
Level of Prevention	Highest—the first line of defense	Middle—the second line of defense				Lowest—the last line of defense
Effectiveness	Most Effective					Least Effective
Goal	<i>To eliminate hazards.</i>	<i>To further minimize and control hazards.</i>				<i>To protect when higher level systems fail.</i>
<b>Examples of Safety Sub-Systems*</b>	<p><b>Technical</b></p> <p>Design and Engineering of Equipment, Processes and Software</p> <p>Management of Change (MOC)**</p> <p>Chemical Selection and Substitution</p> <p>Safe Siting</p> <p>Work Environment<sup>HF</sup></p> <p><b>Organizational</b></p> <p>Staffing<sup>HF</sup></p> <p>Skills and Qualifications<sup>HF</sup></p> <p>Management of Personnel Change (MOPC)</p> <p>Work Organization and Scheduling<sup>HF</sup></p> <p>Allocation of Resources</p> <p>Codes, Standards and Policies*</p>	<p>Inspection and Testing</p> <p>Maintenance</p> <p>Quality Control</p> <p>Turnarounds and Overhauls</p> <p>Mechanical Integrity</p>	<p>Enclosures, Barriers and Containment</p> <p>Relief and Check Valves</p> <p>Shutdown and Isolation Devices</p> <p>Fire and Chemical Suppression Devices</p>	<p>Monitors</p> <p>Process Alarms</p> <p>Facility Alarms</p> <p>Community Alarms</p> <p>Emergency Notification Systems</p>	<p>Operating Manuals and Procedures</p> <p>Process Safety Information</p> <p>Process, Job and Other Types of Hazard Assessment and Analysis</p> <p>Permit Programs</p> <p>Emergency Preparedness and Response</p> <p>Training</p> <p>Information Resources</p> <p>Communications</p> <p>Investigations and Lessons Learned</p>	<p>Personal Decision-making and Actions<sup>HF</sup></p> <p>Personal Protective Equipment and Devices<sup>HF</sup></p> <p>Stop Work Authority</p>
<p>HF – Indicates that this sub-system is often included in a category called <b>Human Factors</b>.</p> <p>* There may be additional subsystems that are not included in this chart. Also, in the workplace many subsystems are interrelated. It may not always be clear that an issue belongs to one subsystem rather than another.</p> <p>** The Codes, Standards and Policies and Management of Change sub-systems listed here are related to Design and Engineering. These subsystems may also be relevant to other systems, for example, Mitigation Devices. When these sub-systems relate to systems other than Design and Engineering they should be considered as part of those other systems, not Design and Engineering.</p>						

## All Systems of Safety Are Not Created Equal!




Surprisingly, the same hazard can often be addressed in more than one system. Take the low pipe in the doorway above, on the next two pages you'll see how this same problem could be handled by each of the major Systems of Safety.

Which is the best approach? Well, if you look at the Systems of Safety Chart on the previous page, you will find the SOS's arranged in order of strength: the most powerful – Design – on down to the least powerful – Personal Protective Factors.


A good investigation team will consider the full range of recommendations for each root cause.

A USW "Lessons Learned" Activity




Sub-systems that include a broad range of working conditions and situations that affect workers.

- Weakest system
- Controls the hazard directly at the individual's level



The instructions and knowledge necessary to maintain and operate equipment or processes


- Easier to affect groups of workers.
- Dependent on individuals' memories and lack of distraction



Devices that warn of a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation.

- Draws attention
- May be missed or ignored

A USW “Lessons Learned” Activity



Sub-systems that automatically act to control or reduce the effect of hazards.

- Workers protected automatically

The system responsible for maintaining, repairing and inspecting equipment and processes.

- Vital to make sure even the best designed system continues to function safely

The primary (highest level) system that designs the hazard out of the process.

- Strongest system
- Hazard eliminated

## **Summary: Lessons Learned**

1. The objective of “lessons learned” is to prevent accidents through identifying and correcting underlying defects in systems of safety. To achieve maximum prevention, all recommended changes should be made.
2. Corrective action resulting from lessons learned is one of the best methods for achieving proactive health and safety. Maximum prevention is achieved by correcting the conditions that led to the incident at other sites in the plant and at other sites.
3. Systems of safety-based analysis help identify the underlying causes of incidents and are valuable for determining what corrective measures should be taken as a result of the lessons learned.
4. Many times the result of an incident investigation is that worker error is identified as the main contributing factor. When a systems of safety-based analysis is used, multiple root causes are usually uncovered.
5. The most effective controls of health and safety hazards are those which are integrated or designed into the process, such as engineering controls. The least effective controls involve personal protective equipment and procedures that merely acknowledge the hazard and do nothing to eliminate it.
6. All work-related hazards must be evaluated before work begins to eliminate or reduce worker exposure to hazards and to prevent injuries.

## Glossary of Terms (Appendix)

Several unique terms are used while doing the “Lessons Learned” exercises. Their definitions are listed below.

**Contributing Factor**—something that actively contributes to the production of a result, an ingredient.

**Fact**—a piece of information presented as having objective reality, an actual occurrence or event.

**Hierarchy of Systems of Safety**—the ranking of systems of safety as to their relative effectiveness in providing accident prevention. This hierarchy is represented by the “Fulcrum” with the most effective system of safety residing on the left side of the lever. Less effective systems reside further to the right on the lever.

**Lessons Learned**—A summation of an investigation that describes safety hazards or conditions with general educational recommendations to identify and correct similar conditions. These differ from investigation recommendations as illustrated below:

*Investigation recommendation:* Replace the carbon steel gate valve on the vacuum tower bottoms line with a chrome valve. The valve failed due to corrosion.

*Lessons Learned:* Verify that carbon steel valves and piping are not used in vacuum tower bottoms service because corrosion can cause them to fail.

**Logic Tree**—a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence to the root causes of the incident.

**Recommendations**—calls for specific changes that address each root cause of an incident or accident to prevent its reoccurrence.

**Root Cause**—basic cause of an accident found in management safety systems.

**Glossary of Terms** (*continued*)

**Supports and Barriers**—“supports” are conditions that promote or render assistance to implementing recommendations while “barriers” are conditions that obstruct the implementation of recommendations.

**Systems of Safety**—management systems that actively seek to identify and control hazards before they result in an incident or injury.

- Design and Engineering
- Maintenance & Inspection
- Mitigation Devices
- Warning Systems
- Procedures and Training
- Personal Protective Factors



### Conducting a “Lessons Learned” Activity

Circle the number that best shows your response to each of the following questions.

1. How easy was it for you to understand the “systems of safety” approach presented in this activity?

<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Very easy</b>	<b>Somewhat easy</b>	<b>Somewhat hard</b>	<b>Very hard</b>

2. How useful do you think this “systems of safety” way of thinking could be for tackling safety and health problems at your workplace?

<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Very useful</b>	<b>Somewhat useful</b>	<b>Not very useful</b>	<b>Of no use</b>

3. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

The logic tree diagram approach can be helpful for analyzing the root causes of safety and health incidents.

<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Strongly agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>

4. Overall, how useful was this “lessons learned activity” for considering safety and health problems at your workplace?

<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Very useful</b>	<b>Somewhat useful</b>	<b>Not very useful</b>	<b>Of no use</b>