

Transporting Technetium Trap Causes Radiological Contamination

Purpose

To share "lessons learned" gained from incident investigations through a small group discussion method format.

To understand "lessons learned" through a Systems of Safety viewpoint.



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Lessons Learned

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
Background Information

Before beginning this Lessons Learned, please review this and the next page which contain information that will introduce the concepts of Lessons Learned and Systems of Safety.

Creating a safe and healthy workplace requires a never ending search for hazards that sometimes are not obvious to us. These hazards exist in every workplace and can be found by using various methods. Lessons Learned are just as the name suggests: learning from incidents to prevent the same or similar incidents from happening again.

Systems Are Not Created Equal: Not equal in protection and not equal in prevention.

Using our Systems Focus to uncover system flaws or root causes is only one part of controlling hazards. We also need to look at the systems involved to decide on the best way to deal with the problem. The most effective way to control a hazard is close to its source. The least effective is usually at the level of the person being exposed. The system of safety in which the flaw is identified is not necessarily the system in which you would attempt to correct the flaw.



Major Safety System	Design & Engineering	Maintenance & Inspection	Mitigation Devices	Warning Devices	Training & Procedures	Personal Protective Factors
Level of Prevention	Highest—the first line of defense		Middle—the seco	nd line of defense		Lowest—the last line of defense
Effectiveness	Most Effective					Least Effective
Goal	To eliminate hazards	7	o further minimize	and control hazard	ds	To protect when higher level systems fail
EXAMPLES OF SAFETY SUB- SYSTEMS**	Technical Design and Engineering of Equipment, Processes and Software Management of Change (MOC)** Chemical Selection and Substitution Safe Siting Work Environment HF Organizational (must address a root cause) Staffing HF Skills and Qualifications HF Management of Personnel Change (MOPC) Work Organization and SchedulingHF Work Load Allocation of Resources Buddy System Codes, Standards, and Policies**	Inspection and Testing Maintenance Quality Control Turnarounds and Overhauls Mechanical Integrity	Enclosures, Barriers Dikes and Containment Relief and Check Valves Shutdown and Isolation Devices Fire and Chemical Suppression Devices Machine Guarding	Monitors Process Alarms Facility Alarms Community Alarms Emergency Notification Systems	Operating Manuals and Procedures Process Safety Information Process, Job and Other Types of Hazard Assessment and Analysis Permit Programs Emergency Preparedness and Response Training Information Resources Communications Investigations and Lessons Learned Maintenance Procedures Pre-Startup Safety Review	Personal Decision-making and Actions HF Personal Protective Equipment and Devices HF Stop Work Authority

HF - Indicates that this sub-system is often included in a category called Human Factors.

* There may be additional subsystems that are not included in this chart. Also, in the workplace many subsystems are interrelated. It may not always be clear that an issue belongs to one sybsystem rather than another.

** The Codes, Standards and Policies and Management of Change sub-systems listed here are related to Design and Engineering. These subsystems may also be relevant to other systems; for example, Mitigation Devices. When these sub-systems relate to systems other than Design and Engineering, they should be considered as part of those other system, not Design and Engineering.





Title: Transporting Technetium Trap Causes

Radiological Contamination

Identifier: Volume 07, Issue 4 Date Issued: January 31, 2007

Lessons Learned Statement:

The inability to keep radioactive pellets from becoming lodged between a Technetium trap and a radiation shield caused a radiological contamination of a roadway between two work stations.

Developing a **Training and Procedure** *System of Safety* that requires the radiation shield to be removed before changing the radioactive pellets not only prevents the pellets from accidentally becoming lodged between the shield and trap but would allow an successful radiological survey.

Discussion:


While transporting a Technetium Trap (a vessel containing magnesium fluoride pellets (MgF₂) which is used to remove Technetium from liquid uranium), it was discovered that some of the pellets had fallen off the trap causing radiological contamination in several locations throughout the facility. The traps were being transported after having the contaminated pellets removed. After pellets are removed, the refurbishment of the traps includes adding and conditioning new pellets at another facility across the plant.

Removing the contaminated pellets require the pellets to be vacuumed from the trap. A glove bag was positioned over the port to minimize spread of the pellets. The radiological survey that was performed on the empty trap showed no radiological issues.

During the investigation it was discovered that about a half cup of pellets had become lodged between the trap and the radiation shield which surrounds part of the trap. The radiation shield was not removed before the survey was performed. Nor was it removed while the pellets were being removed; but rather, the trap was laid on its side with the shield in place. This created a gap between the trap and radiation shield which caused some of the pellets to become lodged between in the gap.

Analysis

The Logic Tree is a pictorial representation of a logical process that maps an incident from its occurrence, "the event," to facts of the incident and the incident's root causes.



Recommended Actions

1. Look at design of glove bag to see if improvements can be made.

2. Remove radiation shield before the vacuuming process to ensure the removal of all pellets.

Education Exercise

Working in your groups and using the Lessons Learned Statement, Discussion, Analysis and Recommended Actions, answer the two questions below. Your facilitator will give each group an opportunity to share answers with the large group.

1.	your workplace.			
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_				

2. Of the examples you generated from Question 1, which will you pursue in your workplace? (**Note:** When we say something "you" may pursue, we mean a joint labor-management activity or a union activity rather than an activity carried out by you as an individual.)



Lessons Learned: Transporting Technetium Trap Causes Radiological Contamination

Please answer the two questions below:

1.	How impo workplace with 5 bein	? (Circle	one.) Rate	e on a scal	•	
	_	_		_	_	

2.	Lessons Learned?			

End of Training Trainer's Instructions

Please complete the information below.

Trainer's Name		
	(Please Print)	
Date of training:		
No. of Participants: Total	_ Hourly	Management
_	-	
Location of Training:		
O		
USW Local #		

Send this page plus the Education Exercise and Evaluation for each participant and the Sign-in sheet to:

Doug Stephens United Steelworkers International Union 3340 Perimeter Hill Drive Nashville TN 37211

Thank you for facilitating the sharing of this Lesson Learned with your coworkers.

Sign-In Sheet

Name of Class	Date of Class
Instructors:	

Please Check One* H M		Print Name	Signature

^{*}H = Hourly Worker

M = Management or Salaried Worker